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Abstract1 
Regulatory enforcement and industrial non-compliance 
are very familiar issues in environmental protectlon and 
water resource management. Current thinking recognizes 
the insufficiency of the traditional regulatory enforcement 
structures that are based orthodox deterrence theory. 
There are, therefore increasing shlfts among some 
industrialized countrles towards "new regulatory reglmes" 
that focus on management styles, and forms of self-
regulation, based on innovatlve and incentive devlce. 
However, the orthodox instruments remain the principie 
means for regulatory enforcement among many developing 
countries. 
Our goal in this paper ¡s to examine the effects of these 
(traditional) regulatory enforcement instruments on firm' 
compliance to wastewater standards in Kenya. We (i) 
examine the state of wastewater regulatory compliance 
and infractlons; (ii) construct and estímate a model of 
enforcement incidence based on monitorlng, inspections, 
warning letters, and court prosecutions; and (iii) discuss 
the linkages in the enforcement framework, and behaviour 
of firms). We use primary and secondary data from 53 
industrial plants across 5 urban areas. The results of our 
model help us to identify flaws In the existing regulatory 
and enforcement "reglme". 
'This paper ¡s based on chapter 8 of my Ph. D. dissertation. While claiming responsibility 
for errors, 1 would llke to acknowledge the comments of Prof. Ole Jess Olsen, Prof. 
Soren Lund, Dr, Dr. Claes Brundanlus, who were members of my dissertation committee 
and Dr. Poul Ove Pedersen. The study was conducted as part of the DANIDA/ENRECA 
activlty organised jolntly between Institute for Development Studies (University of 
Nairobi) and the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. 
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1.0 Iníroduction 
Issues pertaining to monitoring and enforcement of industrial wastewater 
standards remain the object of many empirical analyses. This is because 
industrial wastewater management is a persistent problem for which policy 
prescriptions, in many countries are still ineffective. The traditional (orthodox) 
instruments, applied for industrial wastewater regulation, include monitoring, 
inspections, warning letters and court prosecutions. Even though regulatory 
enforcement has induced limited success in the developed countries (Magat & 
Viscussi, 1990; Laplante & Rilstone 1996), they remain completely detective in 
developing countries. Because of the rapidly growing problem of water resource 
degradation through industrial wastewater pollution, in Kenya, it is of great interest 
to examine how different enforcement activities affect the wastewater 
performance. 
The main instruments, applied for regulating industrial wastewater standards in 
Kenya, include monitoring, inspections, warning letters and court prosecutions. 
Our purpose in this paper is to evalúate firm responses to these enforcement 
instruments, by providing explanations to existing practices. The paper is 
organized as follows: section 2 discusses the conceptual framework and 
institutional issues in firm response to wastewater regulation. Section 3 discusses 
the scope of the study, the enforcement process and model construction. In 
section 4, we discuss the supply of violations: wastewater treatment technologies, 
and display the results of our model on firm response to regulatory instruments. In 
section 5, we provide an overview of firm reactions and limitations of various 
enforcement activities. We conclude in section 6. 
i 
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2.0 Conceptual and Institutionai Issues iri Industrial Wastewater Management 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The guiding assumption, in the analysis of compliance behaviour by firms, is that 
individual firms are economic, rational decision-making units, responding to the 
costs and benefits of participation in legal and ¡Ilegal activities. Firms are assumed 
to subjectively weigh the potential gains and losses of committing regulatory 
infractions. A firm's "gain" function can be represented by rinc = (C n + V n ) where 
C n (current compliance gain levels) and V n (current violation gain levels) are, 
respectively, assumed to be known, with certainty, and that, based on convexity 
assumption for analytical convenience, each is increasing at a decreasing rate in 
the amount of abatement effort. Given that firms select an optimal level of 
wastewater treatment x, if we let a firms' net profits, | |R, be written as 
n * = r r - z ( x ) 
Where |"]r is the profit before wastewater abatement, and z(x) > 0 is the cost of 
abatement, such that costs decrease with increased infractions (wastewater 
pollution), z'(x)=dz/dx<0, where marginal costs equal zero, z'(x')=0, at a threshold 
level of wastewater pollution, X'. Therefore, the firm's marginal benefit, from 
increased wastewater pollution, equals -z'(x). Let society's net gains, n s . given 
the damage by firms' wastewater pollution, be written as 
r r =n" -M(x) 
Where, [~]s. is the gain, given no wastewater pollution, and M(x) is the monetary 
equivalent of the damage suffered, where damages increase with increased 
wastewater pollution, M'(x)sdM/dx>0. The society's marginal cost of increased 
pollution is, therefore, equal to M' (x) (Hanley, et al., 1997:30). 
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From figure 1, the firm's optimum is x', and the society's optimum is x3, level of 
wastewater infractions (pollution). The social optimal level of wastewater 
infractions is determined by taking account of the firms' impact on society. The 
social optimum requires that firms' marginal benefit be balanced against the 
society's marginal costs, -z(x)=M'(x), represented by Xs in figure 1 below. If firms 
ignore the negative impacts on society, they will continué to pollute until their 
marginal benefits from wastewater pollution are zero, -z'(x)=0. 
Fig. 1: lllustrative social (society's) and prívate (firms1) optimai level of 
wastewater abatement 
The basis of our analysis is that, wastewater standards are not self-enforcing and 
that securing of compliance by firms involve efforts, by the regulatory agencies, to 
discourage firms from operating at x'. Enforcement involves (substantial) 
resources, while perfect compliance is neither possible ñor desirable. Therefore, 
the goal of the system should be optimal compliance. That is, the point at which 
MC 
Kshs 
0 X ' 
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the marginal social benefits, accruing from compliance, are equivalent to the 
marginal costs incurred in securing that level of compliance (xs). The return to 
non-compliance (x') is, however, made uncertain because the violator could be 
detected and punished. 
2.2 Institutional Issues 
If we identify the social benefits of compliance as the reduction of unprevented 
damage costs, the preventable losses were there compliance, and the costs, 
comprising mainly those incurred in administrating the system of enforcement, 
then the principal economic goal of enforcement policy is to minimise such costs. 
To understand the relationship between these two costs, and, therefore, explore 
the institutional means of achleving the minimisation goal, we adopt a simplified 
versión of the familiar Becker deterrence model, assuming that individuáis and 
firms comply with regulatory obligations if the expected benefits, derived from 
contravention, are exceeded by the costs. Different probabilities and associated 
costs attach to these possibilities, whether they are sequential or alternatives. This 
condition can be expressed as: 
E(nnc) < P1D1+ P2D2+ P3Ü3+ P4Ü4+...+ pnDn (1) 
Where: E( r inc) is the expected profit, to the offender, from a regulatory infraction; 
p/ is the probability of apprehension by a public agency; and, 
D¡ is the direct and immediate costs, to the firm, resulting from sequential 
apprehension. Thus, each element in the right-hand side of the inequality 
represents the probability, and associated costs, of a different predictable event in 
the enforcement process. 
4 
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There are other aspects that require clarification before we proceed further. First, 
the p¡ and Di variables reflect the potential ofíender's subjective perception of the 
probability of apprehension and of the associated level of costs, respectively, 
rather than their objective valúes. The accuracy of such perceptions will be a 
function of the offender's information costs (Ogus and Abbot, 2001). It follows, 
too, that pD should be weighted to reflect the degree of risk aversión (if any) 
towards the consequences (Polinsky and Shavell, 1979). Secondly, since p refers 
to apprehension by the public agency and not, more narrowly, to a formal 
determination of liability (or guilt), by the court or agency with power to impose a 
penalty, D covers a far wider range of costs than any formal sanction. It, thus, 
includes the "hassle" costs of pressure, by an agency, to comply, legal and other 
defence expenditures, and any stigma (or loss) of reputation, resulting from the 
apprehension and subsequent events. 
2.3 Comparativo Statics 
In our empirical case, the violator faces four sources of uncertainly, corresponding 
to the four stages in the judicial process: (i) detection with a warning (verbal or 
written), (ii) prosecution, (iii) conviction, and (iv) punishment. Even with a 
conviction, the ensuing penalty is not known with certainty. It may take the form of 
an indefinite closure, a fine, forfeiture of water permit, or, indeed, the violator may 
get away with simple warning. It is assumed that, although a potential violator 
does not know ex ante the form of punishment, he does know its magnitude and 
assigns a subjective probability that it may be awarded upon conviction. In 
addition to punishment costs, there is a cost to the defendant, at each prior stage 
of the judicial process. The direct and immediate cost of detection D could include 
5 
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any immediate exchanges (written, verbal), water permit suspensión, or temporary 
closure (depending on the level of attention attracted by the violation). There are 
also direct prosecution costs (A) that would include attorney and /or court costs. 
Institutionally, if the level of monitoring and inspections is high and the threat of 
facing a penalty is real, then compliance by firms is likely. If the direct and 
immediate cost of detection is high, the aggregate expected gains, at non-
compliance, are low. Thus, =>dE(nnc)/SD < 0. If the level of monitoring and 
inspections are high while the threat of a penalty is low, then regulation is not a real 
constraint to the firm, which might prefer to face the penalty. Thus =>5E(rinc)/3D> 
0. If the level of monitoring and inspections are low, and the penalty is high, then the 
firms know that the probability of being caught is very low and they will be less 
obliged to comply. Thus =>5E(rinc)/<3D > 0. When the probability of detection is 
high, the aggregate expected gains at infraction (non-compliance) are low. Thus 
3E(nnc)/dPd < 0. 
All the other parameters behave as follows: <9E(n nc)/9Pp|d ^ 0; SE(nnc)/dPc|p í 0; 
5E(nnc)/5P/|c< 0; and dE(rinc)/d/ ¿ 0. 
Where: A = prosecution costs; 
D = direct and immediate cost of detection; 
Pd = the subjective probability of detection; 
Pp|d = the subjective probability of prosecution; 
Pc|p = the subjective probability of conviction given prosecution; and 
Pyic = the subjective probability of being fined upon conviction. 
6 
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2.4 The Scope ofthe Study 
Urbc.n Areas and Types of Firms Covered 
The firms covered, in our study, belong to the following industrial categories: food 
processing, beverage, textile, pulp and paper, leather and tanning, wood 
producís, and chemical products (see table 1). Our primary criterion, for selecting 
the 53 industrial firms, was based on the dominant water-consuming industrial sub-
sectors in Kenya (Le. falling into 5 broad classes. The justification was to capture 
water-using firms wlth different intensities and characteristics. Our second sampling 
frame entailed identifying the towns from where the firms would be surveyed. The 
selection of urban areas was based on the considerations of water tariffs and 
regulatory implementation. In principie, we chose urban areas whose water 
departments were active in billing of firms and who had departments for the 
enforcement of wastewater quality. The urban areas selected included Nairobi and 
Kisumu cities, Eldoret, Thlka and Nakuru towns. 
7 
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Table 1: Industry Sampling by Sub-Sector 
3 DIGIT TOTAL 
ISIC SECTOR THIKA NAIROBI NAKURU KISUMU ELDORET NUMBER 
CODE 
311 Food Processing 4 1 2 3 10 
0) (1) (0) (0) (2) 
313 Beverage 1 2 1 2 1 7 
Industries (0) (2) (1) (2) (0) (5) 
321 Textiles 5 4 3 4 16 
(4) (3) (2) (0) (9) 


















352/35 Chemical 2 1 4 7 
1 Products/Others (2) (1) (1) (4) 
TOTAL 15 14 8 4 10 51 
(13) (8) (4) (2) (1) (27) 
Surface and Groundwater 87 57 50 50 10 53 
usage (%) 
Source: Survey data. Figures in parenthesís show the number of firms using boreholes/river. Other 
figures show the total number of firms using public sources. 
In the survey, water intensities vary across firms and sectors. The Beverage 
Industries (food processing) sector is the most water intensive, followed by Leather 
and Textiles. Our aggregation also shows that the volume of water discharged, by 
firms surveyed, is very high, constituting over 60% of the water consumed. These 
figures imply that, there is low wastewater recycling rate among firms. The figures 
also suggest that there are great potentials, for water resource conservation, among 
the surveyed industries. 
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A graphical illustration of the water consumption magnitudes involved is given in 
figure 2. From a policy perspective, the figure gives some indication of where the 
potential for industrial water savings lie, For example, in the pulp and paper 
industries, the bulk of the water is used in "process" with only a very small fraction 
going to wastewater. This suggests that the potential for recycling is nearly 
exhausted and, further savings can be attained through change of production 
technology, The situation in the other industries is radically different with the bulk of 
the water discharged as wastewater. The implications for water pricing can also be 
radically different. Firms that generate large volumes of wastewater might have easy 
technical options for wastewater reduction that may not be cost sensitive. Henee, 
pricing and regulation, on the input side, in these industries could lead to large water 
savings at relatively low costs. 
9 
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Figure 2: Average Monthly Water Consumption and Wastewater Discharged 
Industrial Water Use by Fate in Kenya 
Food Textiles Wood Others 
Industrial Sectors 
Water Consumption ^Wastewater 
Source: Own Survey Data 
Notes: Water consumption = recycling + consumptive + losses. (2) Wastewater=discharges. (3) Total 
consumption = Water consumption + wastewater. 
3.0 Regulatory Approaches for the Enforcement of Wastewater Standards in 
Kenya 
There are three (3) judicial steps in the enforcement of industrial wastewater 
standards in Kenya. We have summarised the orgnizational arrangements covering 
the steps in Figure 3. The first step involves monitoring and inspection of the firms. 
The inspection could be triggered by citizens' complaints, environmental meetings, 
self-reported samples, or own field inspection by enforcement officers in the Ministry 
of Environment and Natural Resources (MENR) or Local authorities (LA). In the 
case of Local Authorities (LA), samples are delivered to own laboratory (lab) within 
the town and further action (i.e warning letters or even court action) may follow afler 
the analysis. In the case of MENR's enforcement, the samples collected are taken to 
Nairobi for analysis. The MENR's enforcement officers, on the ground, can issue 
10 
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warning letters, but they have to consult with the parent ministry in Nairobi, before 
taking any court action. The second and third judicial steps are warning or advisory 
letters and court action, respectively. 
11 
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3. i Step 1: Monitoring and Field Inspections 
Monitoring activities (field inspections and waste water sampling) are undertaken 
in all the urban areas. Sometimes, complaints made by citizens, or highlighted in 
newspapers, regarding environmental incidents, also give rise to enforcement. 
However, there are widespread variations in the enforcement strategies for 
different urban areas. 
Self-Reporting as a way of Monitoring 
Thika and Nakuru by-laws require firms to self-report their wastewater compliance 
status. The apex of enforcement activities in Thika is the District Environmental 
Committee/meetings, where all industries are challenged to justify, or defend, their 
compliance status, on various environmental parameters (wastewater quality 
being one of them). Nakuru town has an organized Inter-Ministerial Working 
Group (IWG) for the coordination and supervisión of various institutions that are 
geared towards environmental protection and management of Lake Nakuru, in 
collaboration with the local Agenda 21 initiative - Pollutant Release Transfer 
Register (PRTR)I1l 
3.2 Step 2: Warning and Advisory Letters 
Warning and Advisory letters were a major tool of enforcement in Thika, Nakuru 
and Eldoret and, to a smaller extent, Kisumu. Nairobi city had the lowest number 
of such letters. We have provided samples of a warning letter's l2¡ and advisory 
letterl3), elsewhere, to avoid ambiguity in definition. Overall, the number of warning 
and advisory letters, sent to firms, is very large. These letters varied a great deal, 
in content, and we could categorise them into the following: (i) those advising 
firms on what steps to take in order improve their wastewater quality, (ii) 
13 
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reminders to firms to meet their obligations, as earlier agreed (iii) threats of action, 
if measures are not taken (iv) statutory notices that court action is imminent unless 
remedial measures are undertaken within a stipulated period. 
3.3 Step 3: Court Prosecutions and Penalties for Violations 
Court prosecutions represent the ultímate step in the enforcement process for 
wastewater regulation. Procedurally, when firms fail to comply with advisory, 
warning, and statutory notices, they should be eligible for court action. If the polluting 
agency has obtained a water permit for abstraction of water from a river or ground 
source, the WAB may withdraw the water permit untll the situation is rectified. 
3.4 Other Regulatory Approaches/lnstruments 
3.4.1 Suspensión and Revocation of Water use Permit 
One of the enforcement tools currently available to the Ministry of Water 
Development, for the enforcement of standards, is the suspensión of firms' water 
use licence whenever violations are "sufficiently of concern". For firms whose main 
source of water are rívers and boreholes, revocation and suspensión of a water 
permit (or licence) could be a much more effective tool than court action because (i) 
it poses a credible threat to production as firms can stop production altogether when 
access to water is denied, (¡i) suspensión of a permit does not require any court 
decisión and it can be handled administratively within MENR. (iii) Furthermore, it 
does not require skilled or technical personnel, such as court prosecutors, to 
enforce. Ironically, the power of revocation is used extremely sparingly even though 
the enforcement agency has absolute control over this. It remains the most difficult 
instrument to enforce in Kenya due to economic, social, and political factors. 
14 
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Over the last 10 years, ¡t appears that only 6-8 threats have been made by the 
enforcement agencies over the use of this instrument. We found out that only two 
instances were carried out during the last ten years (revocation and suspensión). 
From a deterrence perspective, it might seem to make sense to proceed with permit 
revocation/suspension only when the court system does not appear to achieve 
compliance. But, there is no compelling evidence that this is the enforcement 
agency policy in Kenya; all we know is that the two cases were not pursued through 
the courts before the action was taken. 
3.4.2 Sewer Charges 
One of the most distinctive features of the Urban Water Provisión in Kenya is the 
sewer charge, which accompanies all water consumption within the municipalities. 
The sewer charge is meant to finance nearly 100 per cent of expenditures, including 
the construction and operation and maintenance of Wastewater Treatment Plants. In 
most of the urban areas, the sewer charge is volumetric and is as high as 50-100 
per cent the cost of water itself. Ideally, the charge should follow the rule that the 
polluter pays, particularly for industrial firms, but this is not the case. In any case, 
very little of the money collected is injected back into the Sewer Treatment Works. 
One argument that the industries have presented to the Local Authorities, over the 
years, is that they (the industries) pay a sewer charge commensurate with the 
volume of water consumed, yet, they have to comply with wastewater standards. 
15 
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3.4.3 Violation Charges 
All the Local Authorities by-laws stipulate financial penalties that vlolating firms 
should pay. For example, in Thika and Eldoret, a firm which contravenes, or fails 
to comply with the wastewater by-laws, or any of the conditions imposed by the 
council on water, is guilty of an offence and is liable to(41: (i) in the case of a first 
offence, a fine not exceeding two thousand shillings (US$30), or imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment; (¡i) in the 
case of a second offence...one thousand shillings or an imprisonment sentence 
for a term not exceeding nine months, or both such fine and imprisonment; and 
(iii) where an offence is of a continuous nature, the offender shall in addition to the 
penalties prescribed ...pay an addltional fine or five thousand shillings per day, for 
the period in which the offence continúes. In Eldoret, the penalties stipulate that 
(a) an extra five shillings (Kshs) will be added on to the rates for effluents 
exceeding any of the following limits, based on grab sample analysis done by the 
Council, once every six months; (b) while a penalty of Kshs 100,000 (one hundred 
thousand) per month will be charged on effluent exceeding any of the limits given 
for various toxic chemicals. In Thika and Eldoret, towns suggest that these 
"economic instruments" are prone to serious difficulties, especially, because they 
demand credible and scientific procedures to implemento In both towns, the 
penalties have remalned "paper tigers" in the bye-laws that have not been 
implemented. 
3.4.4 Trade Effluent Charges 
The "trade effluent" charges are "the extra sewerage (wastewater) charges paid to 
the service provider (WSP) in order to reflect the additional costs created by the 
16 
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treatment of highly polluted or difficult to treat sewage (wastewater)." Since 1970s, 
there have been joint efforts, by Sewerage División of the Ministry of Water 
Development and the Ministry of Local Government, to develop a system of 
enforcing wastewater standards in Local Authorities, by charging the industries, 
on the basis of treatability, for their wastewater i.e. by possibly using the modified 
Mogden formula for charging purposes. Crude forms of the application of this 
charge are found in the by-Laws of Thika and Eldoret towns. However, the 
development of this trade effluent charge is still inhibited by many factors including 
resistance by industries and politicians. 
4.0 The Supply of Wastewater Violation Compliance 
4.1 Wastewater Treatment Facitities/ Technologies by Firms 
The level of sophistication of wastewater treatment plants required varies with the 
type of industrial activity and scale of production. It should be remembered that, 
even within the same sub-sector, there can be dramatic differences in the type of 
goods produced, henee the toxicity of wastewater and thus the requisite wastewater 
pre-treatment facilities. This variation was more pronounced among the food 
processing industries surveyed. Most firms have installed wastewater abatement 
gadgets that are summarized in Table 2. 
17 
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Table 2: Wastewater Treatment Facilities/ Technologies 
Wastewater Treatment Number Number with Number of Type of Treatment 
Visited wastewater wastewater 
treatment treatment facilities 
working during 
survey 
Food Processing 10 7 4 [a], [b], [d], [c], [ f ] 
Beverage Industries 7 6 4 [a], [d] 
Textiles 16 12 6 [a], [c], [g],[d] 
Leather Products 5 5 4 [a], [b], [d], [c] 
Wood Products 1 1 0 [o], [a] 
Pulp and Paper 5 4 4 [c], [a] 
Chemical Products and Others 7 4 2 [c], [d], [a], [e],( f ] 
Total 53 38 24 
Percentageof Total 100 72 45 
Source: Own Survey Data 
Note: Types of Treatment include:- Physical: [a] =settlement; [b]=floatation; [c]=screening:-
Biological: [d]=aerobic'1'; [e]=Anaerobic 2l :- Other: [f]=deep well injection; [g]=precipitation with 
chemicals; [*]=municipal sewer. 
4.2 Status of Wastewater Treatment Facilities 
Even though 72 percent of the firms surveyed had facilities, only 45 percent of the 
facilities were operating at the time of the survey. Most firms had seepage pits, as 
alternative buffers to oxidation ponds. The proportion of firms with wastewater 
treatment facilities is highest in Thika and lowest in Kisumu while all firms in Thika 
had facilities, only 73 percent of these were working during the survey. In Kisumu, 
only one (1) plant at the Kisumu brewery (25 percent of the facilities) was 
operating. Several factors explain the variations in the status of wastewater 
treatment facilities. We observed a general tendency for the larger firms to own 
treatment equipments probably, because of the visibility of the actions. This 
scenario was true across all sectors. 
18 
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4.3 Disposal Patterns of Industrial Wastewater 
All firms in urban areas had the option of discharging wastewater into three points: 
(i) the open streams, (ii) municipal sewer, or (iii) both. However, wastewater disposal 
patterns varied, a great deal, across the urban areas. In Thika, 40 percent of the 
firms were discharging their wastewater into the municipal sewer, 7 percent were 
discharging into a nearby river or stream, while the remaining 33 percent were 
discharging into both the river and municipal sewer. In Nairobi, 73 percent were 
discharging into the municipal sewer, 7 percent into rivers/ nearby streams, and 20 
percent into both municipal sewer and open streams. In Nakuru, 78 percent were 
discharging into municipal sewer and the other 22 percent into both municipal sewer 
and open streams. In Kisumu, 50 percent were disposing their wastewater into 
municipal sewer and the other 50 percent into rivers and municipal sewers. In 
Eldoret, 60 percent and 40 percent were discharging into municipal sewer and both 
streams and sewers, respectively. A summary of the modes of disposal has been 
provided in Table 3. In general, 60 percent of the firms were discharging into 
municipal sewers alone, 13 percent into streams alone, while 27 percent were 
discharging ther wastewater into both sewers and streams. Firms using the public 
sewer have to pay sewer charges and make mínimum ¡nvestments to comply with 
the stipulated standards and by-laws. In víew of these differences: 
i) Firms with large volumes of wastewater to díspose might find it 
advantageous to dispose off the effluents in a way that minimizes their 
costs i.e. into rivers. 
ii) Dírty firms (pollution-íntensive firms) should find it less costly to 
discharge into municipal sewers, sínce the wastewater standards are 
lower. 
19 
IDS Working Paper 537 
In relation to the first case (i), there was a pattern, in Thika town, for firms with self -
supplied water, to avoid paying sewer charges, by preferring to discharge into 
streams and rivers. On the other hand, sewer charges are based on quantities of 
water consumed and the municipal authorities attempt to monitor these quantities of 
water. Such firms prefer own disposal to avoid paying the sewer charges. In the 
process, the firms find that they have large volumes of wastewater to dispose in 
rivers and open streams. The main problem with this choice is that the firm has to 
contend with the Ministry of Water's wastewater standards, which are much 
stringent than for the firms discharging into municipality sewers. For this reason, 
violation of standards was more likely for firms discharging into streams. Another 
reason for preferring streams is that, it proves, somehow, tricky for the enforcement 
officers to detect a violation, once the discharge had entered the streams/rivers. 
What the firms needed to do is optimize on the timing of the discharge, to avoid 
detection (i.e. by discharging at night or during weekends). In relation to the second 
case (ii), we have not observed a systematic pattern of dirty industries preferring to 
discharge into municipal sewers. Disposal patterns, among the dirty firms, (mainly 
leather, chemical, wood and paper) were much more dependent on their location, 
with the firms located cióse to rivers having the tendency to discharge into rivers, 
rather than into sewers. 
4.4 Model Construction 
To examine the effect of enforcement activities, and the effectiveness of 
regulatory instruments, we need to model (i) the linkage between the violation 
rates (supply of violations) and the enforcement instruments (i.e. the sanction 
variables) with respect to the risks such as probability of detection (Pd), 
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prosecution (Pp|d), conviction (Pc|p), and fines (P/|c), Previous studies have used 
empirical information on observed violations, (ii) number of prosecutions, and (iii) 
the proportion of prosecutions that result in conviction, as indicators of 
probabilities for various enforcement variables (Furlong, 1991; Polinsky and 
Shavel, 1979; Laplante and Rilstone, 1996; and Lanoi and Feamley, 1998). 
A number of other factors also appeared to determine the compliance status of 
industrial firms in our survey. First, because of their activities, firms in certain 
sectors such as the leather and tannery (dirty industries) appeared susceptible to 
infractions than others (e,g. food and beverage). Secondly, water consumption 
levels also appeared to be an ¡mportant factor, since the large water consumers 
also had problems with installing elabórate abatement facilities sufficient to avoid 
infractions. Their wastewater problem was much more visible, and posed greater 
concems for the authorities. 
In view of the above factors, the basic equation tested in this paper follows the 
work of Furlong (1991), Polinsky & Shavel (1979), Laplante & Rilstone (1996), and 
Lanoi & Feamley (1998), In which: 
VIORATE,, =cc0+alWATl + a,INSPtt + cciINSPll_i + a,PdtA + 
(2) 
« s ^ W i +abPc\piJ-\ +aipficj +aA-„ +£» 
Where: 
i=l,2,3, N stands for plants; t=l,2,3>-.--T stands for time; 
VIORATEit represents the sum of regulatory infractions (BOD, TSS, COD) divided 
by number of inspections; INSP¡t represents the number of inspections performed 
at plant i at time t; 
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INSPu-i represent the cumulative inspections performed at piant / up to time t-1; 
Defini t ion: P7|C = Pc|p(Pp|d) and Pc= (Pd)Pc|P(PP|d) 
The most obvious question that arises in the context of the above equation 
concerns the possible endogeneity of sanctions, and the consequent impact on 
the least squares estimates. For example, while we are generally interested in 
estimating the response of firms (violation rates) to enforcement (sanction 
variables etc), diffículties arise in that "enforcement or level of sanctions" at any 
given time t may itself be a function of violation or compliance at time t (that is the 
enforcement authority may observe non-compliance at time t, and then decide 
whether or not to inspect at time f). In other words, inspections may themselves 
be endogenous and correlated with the same variables that determine current 
pollution levels. If this is the case, least-square estimates will be biased in general. 
In fact, both Magat & Viscussi (1990), and Laplante & Rilstone (1996) have 
rejected the hypothesis that inspections were exogenous. As a result, Magut and 






P / | c 
WAT 
dsi 
Probability of detection 
Probability of prosecution 
Probability of conviction (not appearing in the equation) 
Probability of conviction given prosecution 
Probability of fines 
Volume of water used 
Firm specific effeets and; 
are the usual error terms 
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effort (inspections). Laplante & Rilstone (1996) on the other hand have preferred 
to estímate an inspection equation and use it to re-estimate their basic inspection 
model by instrumental variables using expected inspected as instruments. 
Interestingly, these last authors have found out that the probability of an 
inspection, in any given period, is a decreasing function of past inspections - the 
regulator's monitoring strategy thus being akin to one of sampling without 
replacement. To control this (and to identify the resulting parameters), it is 
necessary to model the sanctions, using some variables that do not enter the 
basic model. 
Interviews with the Ministry of Water and Local Authority enforcement officers 
indícate that inspections are motivated by several considerations. First, the 
volume of wastewater discharged seems to be a factor: small water consumers 
are less likely to be inspected than larger consumers. Secondly, there seems to 
be an effort to visit as many plants as possible. Thus, an obvious implication of 
this "sampling without replacement" strategy is that a plant knows that, all things 
being equal, the probability of an inspection, even when a firm is a major water 
consumer, is inversely related to the number of previous visits. 
In response to wastewater regulation (VIORATE), in this study, we look at the 
control of three main measures of water pollution. The first, biological oxygen 
demand (BOD), is not a direct measure of water pollutant, but measures the effects 
on the environment of a number of pollutants. The second, total suspended solids 
(TSS), is a direct measure of the presence of solid waste emissions in the water 
supply. The two measures are often correlated, but constitute separate poiicy goals, 
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and require, to some extent, different abatement technologies. In particular, 
elimination of TSS requires a primary treatment, based on gravity, while the 
elimination of BOD requires both a primary and secondary treatment, based on 
biological processes. The third measure is chemical oxygen demand (COD). 
For the purpose of estimation, we have assumed that: (1) the firm-specific effects 
are random; (2) the error term is uncorrelated with the variables and well behaved; 
(3) all the right-hand side variables in the sanction equation are doubly exogenous -
that is, uncorrelated with the firm-specific effects as well as with the error term. This 
is a very drastic assumption, given our awareness that the beverage sub-sector has 
the highest levels of water consumption and waste generation. (4) Also assumed 
away are the lock-in-failures or threshold effects where firms are "locked in" to 
complex systems of current technology and where the associated infrastructure, 
skills, knowledge, and capabilities are dominant. Water management systems face 
lock-in failures. Most of the urban water supply, storm water and "wastewater" 
management systems are based on technologies, or systems, of the past. (5) There 
are several other implicit assumptions in our model, for example one or more of the 
following contingencies must occur, if the compliance condition is to be met: Firms 
are highly risk-averse; The potential firms' subjective perception of the formal 
sanction likely to be imposed is very high; The potential firms significantly over-
estimate the probability of a conviction and formal sanction. 
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4.4.1 Computing Subjective Probabilities 
Figure 4 shows cumulative enforcement activities, for the firms covered in five urban 
areas. The figure also shows that convictions for wastewater infractions were much 
lower than episodes of court prosecutions, while inspections were also much higher 
than all the other judicial measures. 
Figure: 4 
Wastewater Enforcement Practice (Kenya) 
(1990-2000) 
Inspections Advisory Letters Vteming Letters Court Prosecutions Convictions 
Nurrber of Cases or Episodes 
On the basis of primary and secondary information on inspections, advisory letters 
and court action, we have computed various probabilities for the sectors studied. 
These are summarised in Table 3. 
The probability of detection (Pd) is defined here as the sum of advisory letters and 
warning or statutory letters divided by inspections. The probability of prosecutions 
leading to detection (PP|d) is defined as court prosecutions divided by the sum of 
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advisory letters and warning or statutory letters. The probability of conviction arising 
from prosecution (PCjp) is defined as convictions divided by court prosecutions. 














Convictions Pd Pp¡<f 
Food 10 574 244 97 6 6 0.594 0.018 
Beverage 7 87 53 21 4 3 0.851 0.054 
Textile 16 466 215 91 10 7 0.657 0.033 
Leather 6 271 174 59 6 6 0.860 0.026 
Wood & 
Products 1 41 11 9 1 0 0.488 0.050 
Pulp and 
Paper 5 105 73 20 2 2 0.886 0.022 
Chemicals 
& Others 8 158 77 30 4 3 0.677 0.037 
Total 53 1702 847 327 33 27 0.689 0.028 
Pop 
Source: Own Survey Data 
The above (Table 3) estimates suggest that, given the levels of inspection across 
sectors: (i) Detection was much more likely in the pulp and paper, followed by 
leather industries. This observation seems to indícate that there is concentration of 
enforcement activities in these sectors. (ii) Prospects for prosecution, upon 
detection, were, however highest among wood and chemicals, suggesting that 
regulatory authorities are much more efficient in monitoring certain discharge points. 
Even though the results suggest that, ceteris paribus, plants whose emissions are 
most likely to impose high environmental damages are facing a higher probability 
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of being inspected and warned, the probability of an inspection appears to be an 
increasing function of the final discharge point for the plant i.e. either a stream or 
municipal sewer. Moreover, we suspect that these outcomes are heavily influenced 
by the primary motivation of the enforcement agencies, (iii) Conviction, upon 
prosecution, is much more likely among the leather tanneries than any other 
industry. 
4.4.2 Enforcement by Towns 
Table 4: Comparison of Enforcement by Towns 













Conviclions Pn Pp,d Pc,p 
Thika 15 634 316 114 13 8 0.678 0.030 0.846 
Nairobi 15 509 221 64 10 6 0.559 0.035 0.800 
Nakuru 9 155 61 28 - - 0.574 0.000 0.000 
Kisumu 4 203 146 26 4 3 0.847 0.023 0.750 
Eldoret 10 201 103 95 6 4 0.985 0.030 0.833 
Total 53 1702 847 327 33 27 0.689 0.028 0.818 
Source: Own Survey Data 
Notes: Probability of detection (Pd) is defined here as the sum of advisory letters and warning or 
statutory letters divided by inspections. Probability of prosecution given detection (Pp¡d) is defined as 
court prosecutions divided by the sum of advisory letters and warning or statutory letters. Probability of 
conviction given prosecution (Pc(p) is defined as convictions divided by court prosecutions. 
The above estimates (Table 4) suggest that (i) Given the levels of inspections, 
detection of violation was much more likely in Eldoret followed by Kisumu, Nakuru, 
Thika and finally Nairobi, (ii) A detected violation is much more likely to be 
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prosecuted in Nairobi, foliowed by Thika, Kisumu. (ii) A prosecuted firm is much 
more likely to be convicted in Kisumu, foliowed by Nairobi, Eldoret, Thika and finally 
Nakuru. 
4.4.3 Model Results: The effect of Regulatory Instruments 
A summary of wastewater violations is displayed in table 5. The results are 
displayed in two columns (1), and (2). In the first column, (1) we display the model 
results when all the sanction variables (Pd, Pp|d, and PC|P) are used in our 
estimation equation. In the second column (2), we replace Pp|d, and PC|P by Pc|d, 
since the latter results from the former. Our results show the test for the response 
to enforcement on the violation rates for absolute discharges of BOD standards. 
Table 5 Tobit Estimates of Supply of Wastewater Violations by Sector _ 
(1) (2) 
Constant 0.1193 0.1079 
INSPECTIONii -0.1713 -0.1149 
INSPECTIONui - 0.2080 -0.1965 
Pd -0.1141 -0.0181 
Pp¡d -0.0911 -
Pc¡p - 0.0042 -
Pc|d - -0.0041 
Textile 0.1421 00119 
Leather 0.3643 0.2006 
Food 0.1152 0.1616 
Beverage 0.0411 0.0321 
Pulp 0.1461 0.0133 
Wood 0.3316 0.4756 
Other 0.0521 0.2355 
WATER 0.6144* 0.4414* 
Log Likelihood Function 19.334 17.284 
Number of Observations 53 53 
Source: Own Survey Data 
Note: Significant at 95 percent level. Probability of detection (Pd) is defined here as inspections divided by the 
sum of advisory letters and warning or statutory letters. Probability of prosecution given detection (Pp,d) is defined 
as court prosecutions divided by the sum of advisory letters and warning or statutory letters. Probability of 
conviction given prosecution (Pc¡p) is defined as convictions divided by court prosecutions. 
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From the model estimates, the perceived magnitude of the expected inspections, 
and prosecution fines are, each, estimated to reduce infractions, as indicated by 
the negative coefficients associated with in all the three columns. However, a 
given increase in the expected inspections, detections, prosecutions, and fines do 
not have an increasing or larger effect along the progression. This does not make 
any intuitive sense. Furthermore, none of the estimates of the deterrent effect of 
penalties on violation rates is statistically significant. The violation rates are 
strongly correlated with the water consumption levels and suggest that higher 
water consuming firms in Kenya are much more likely to viólate wastewater 
standards than otherwise. Sector-specific dummies have a positive coefficient, but 
none of these are significant. This implies that we could not use industrial sectors 
in Kenya as a basis for predicting wastewater standards' infractions. 
4.4.4 Elasticities of Wastewater Violations 
A comparison of the relative impacts of different explanatory variables on the 
violation rates is provided in Table 6, where elasticities for selected variables are 
presented. From among the policy variables, inspections induce the largest 
violations response (in terms of elasticities), For example, a one percent increase 
in inspections is predicted to deter 0.061 percent of violations. 
29 
IDS Working Paper 537 
Table 6 Elasticities of the Supply of Violations with Respect to Sanction 
(1) (2) Mean 
INSPit 0.061 0.077 0.0205 
INSPÍ.M 0.017 0.022 0.0194 
Pd 0.002 0.003 0.0118 
Pp,d 0.010 - - 0.0931 
Pc,P 0.003 - - 0.0124 
Pc,d - 0.006 0.0910 
Source: Own Survey Data 
Notes: Significant at 95 percent level. Probability of detection (Pd) is defined here as inspections 
divided by the sum of advisory letters and warning or statutory letters. Probability of prosecution given 
detection (PP|d) is defined as court prosecutions divided by the sum of advisory letters and warning or 
statutory letters. Probability of conviction given prosecution (Pc|p) is defined as convictions divided by 
court prosecutions. INSPit represents the number of inspections performed at plant i at time t; 
INSP¡.t-i is cumulative inspections performed at plant i up to time t-1; 
Elasticities for detection, prosecution and fines are considerably smaller than 
those for inspections. The ranking of elasticties in Table 6 does not, generally, 
conform to the theoretical predictions at the beginning of the paper. 
5.0 Reactions to Various Enforcement Activities 
5.1 Reactions to Warning Letters and Statutory Notices 
Most firms surveyed seemed to respond to inpections and warning letters by 
announcing investments, but these investments did not seem to have much effect 
on effluents. Another common behavior noted among the firms was for them to 
declare that they had engaged consultants for the design of their wastewater 
treatment works. In most cases, it took several years for the consultants to come 
up with the requisite designs. A number of firms had shoddy waste treatment 
plants, for which they heaped blame on design engineers, and bad advice from 
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the enforcement officers. Some firms remained completely defiant and sought 
protection through political patronage whenever faced with the threat of 
punishment. 
5.2 Reactions to Court Prosecutions 
From tables 3 and 4, we observe that, the probability of prosecution given detection 
is very low Kenya. The decisión to prosecute is also lengthy, given that many cases 
are repeatedly referred to the headquarters before such a decisión can be made. 
However, in instances where public outcry instigates the process, evidence is 
collected hurriediy and prosecution can be sure to follow. This is despite the fact that 
firms should have received múltiple warning letters before the decisión to prosecute 
can be reached. To most firms, the prosecution costs comprise, mainly of the legal 
(lawyers) fees and the costs for attending court hearings i.e. transport, and other 
manpower costs. 
Some firms engage lawyers to put up a strong defence, while others encourage their 
lawyers to take a cost-minimization approach. For example, convictions are always 
likely since most firms prefer to enter "a guilty" plea, probably, to cut down on the 
prosecution costs. This practice raises the probability of conviction given 
prosecution. Often, the probability of being fined upon conviction is also very low. 
For example, of the 33 firms who had faced some court prosecution before, there 
were 27 convictions (80 percent). Of these 27, only about half of them had been 
fined. Others had been acquitted, or ordered to take remedial measures within a 
given duration. Often, the firms got away with a simple warning. In any case, the 
fines have been very low, as they are limited by Law, and are not in excess of Kshs 
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3000. Experience, with court prosecutions, violates our initial assumption that court 
action is the apex of regulatory enforcement sanctions. 
We can, however, make several observations in regard to the court prosecutions: 
1. One general observation about court cases is that, there was a 
common trend for firms to enter a "guilty" plea, when they 
expected that the case was going to take long (with higher 
legal charges), henee, they preferred to face the penalties 
which, in all cases, could not exceed Kshs.3000. 
2. Several firms indicated that, even if they thought they were not 
guilty of the offence, they still found it appropriate to enter a 
guilty plea to the save company's resources (time, financial). 
3. In a majority of firms' violation that led to court prosecutions, 
the firms "relaxed" once a court verdict had been announced, 
not expecting further regulatory activity for a while, while they 
continued with violations. Some of the firms even resorted to 
more covert activities to conceal their actions. 
5.3 Other Institutional Weaknesses in the Enforcement Process 
We consider that most of the problems encountered, during regulatory enforcement, 
emanate from a low level of implementation rather than any serious deficiencies in 
the legal provisions. We mainly attribute the low level of enforcement to the following 
factors: 
32 
IDS Working Paper 537 
(i) The múltiple agencies with different mandates, each agency trying to 
define the laws and activities on the basis of its narrow mandates. No 
agency expressed interest in correlating their tasks with the others; 
The multiplicity of enforcement agencies on wastewater regulation in Kenya 
present numerous difficulties and raise questions on the appropriateness of the 
institutional arrangement. The fact that there are many acts, rules, regulations and 
by-laws, with regard to the multiplicity of agencies involved in the regulation of 
industrial wastewater, means that there are widespread variations in interest and 
focus across the country. We have summarized the distribution of these múltiple 
agencies and levels of enforcement in Table 7. 
Table 7: Levels of Enforcement Activities of Different Agencies 




E =3 in 
2 o •O 
1— •Z. z : LU 
LA-Water & Sanitation Department V(2) 
LA - Public Health Department V( 2) V(3) V(3) 
MENR-Dis t r ic t Water Office V( 1) V( 4) V( 4) V(3) V(2) 
Environment Sanitation V(4) 
Labour/ Industry Inspectorate V(1) 
NGOs - WWF for Nature V( 2) 
Other Departments Involved 
LVEMP V( 2) 
KEMFRI 
Extent of involvement (1) very high (2) high (3) médium (4) low: LVEMP =Lake Victoria Environmental 
Management Project; KEMFRI=Kenya Marine Fisheries Research Institute; WWF= World Wide Fund. 
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Some urban areas have a high number of agencies interested in wastewater 
regulation and high levels of activities by the agencies involved: 
(ii) The división of responsibilities among múltiple agencies, with little 
coordination, made it procedurally difficult to harmonize operations, thus 
leading to lack of interest among some departments that felt 
disadvantaged. 
(iii) There was a notable absence of what can best be described as the 
"philosophy of enforcement" (or infernal policies and principies) by the 
various government departments - a shortfall that we attribute to 
apathy emanating from multiplicity of agencies. This apathy was greater 
at sénior levels - to some extent. This was reflected by the 
comparatively júnior grade officers responsible for enforcement while 
the sénior officers engaged in non-enforcement activities. 
(iv) While the legal enforcement process is very limiting in terms of burden 
of proof, the valué of the process is further diminished when the 
penalties meted out to the guilty firms is very low. 
(v) Due to a multiplicity of enforcement agencies, most firms also 
expressed frustration with the criss-crossing of their premises by 
múltiple government enforcement agencies from different 
departments as they conducted inspections. This problem was more 
severe in towns with múltiple enforcement agencies for different 
aspects of industrial regulation. 
(vi) Enforcement styles differed across different agencies. For example, 
Table 8 shows that: 
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1) There is emphasis on the use of economic instruments by the 
local authorities, and some have attempted to impose trade effluent 
charges. Thus, they have stipulated violation charges in their by-
laws, mostly based on revenue requirements, which has become a 
source of rentseeking; 
2) The MENR puts emphasis on regulatory compliance with the 
standards, but is limited in effectiveness due to logistical problems, 
especially on court prosecutors; 
3) Some local authorities have adopted instruments without 
considering implementation capacity e.g. the emphasis on self— 
reporting, without a proper incentive framework; and 
4) There is too much discretion left on the part of enforcement 
officers. 
1 c* U l t ? 3 , O U I I I I 1 I C i l f U l t l l l U l l . e m c i u i i i o n U I H B I H 9 
Ministryof Water (MENR) Local Authorities 
Main Extent of Usage Impleme- Effecti- Extent of Implemen Effecti-
strateciies ntabiiitv veness Usaae -tabilitv veness 
Monitoring Self- Moderate (b) Moderate Low Low Moderate Poor 
and reporting (a) Low (a) (b) (b) 
X J 
c Inspections Samplíng (b) Low (a) 
(VI 
- O " o Warning Selective High High Low High Low l.ow 
c 
ro Letters E 
E O Court Action Fines (a) Moderate(a) Low Moderate Poor Poor Poor o o Closures (b) Poor (b) 
Water Permit Cancellations Low Poor High 
Financial Violation Proposal Poor Could bi 
¿ 2 
Penalties penalties in 2 towns effective 
E c <1) 
c Sewer % of water All towns High Moderate 
e o 
c 
2 Charge consumed 
o 
LU 
... Trade Water Proposal Poor Could bi 
Effluent volume & in 2 towns effective 
Charqe 
Source: Own Field Data Notes: (1) High (2) Moderate (3) Low (4) Poor 
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6.0 Conclusions 
The decentralized nature of polluting activity, some of which is clandestine, and the 
institutional requirements mentioned earlier make violation levels more difficult to 
monitor. Assessments on wastewater regulations indícate that regulations are 
ineffective in promoting their objectives for two general reasons: First, there are 
ineffectively designed regulatory policies, such that, although there is compliance 
with the regulatory requirements, with each intervention, little or no beneficial effect 
has been observed. For example, there is a mismatch in the hierarchical steps of the 
judicial process, since penalties are not graduated, thus making industrial firms 
indifferent to threats of the most severe penalties. In all circumstances, the expected 
gains from violation are quite high. Therefore, some firms viólate, these regulations, 
expecting the most severe penalty at some point, and will continué polluting after 
facing the penalties. 
One other defect is the misplaced focus on the requirement that firms install pre-
treatment gadgets. Since many firms have managed to install "some form" of these 
facilities, enforcement efforts, by the regulatory agencies, have been shifted to 
monitoring the appropriateness and the working conditions of these facilities. Most 
firms, observed, had changed their behavioral game plan upon installation of such 
facilities. The installations, although perceived as the first step towards compliance, 
do not lead to automatic compliance, as most of them remain ineffective due to (a) 
poor design, (b) high cost of operation and maintenance that firms avoid to incur. 
The overall implication is that, installation of pre-treatment facilities has not produced 
any reductions in violations. 
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The second problem with regulatory enforcement is the lack of clear procedure for 
enforcement. For example, even though there exists extensive regulatory 
requirements, they are, as a tradition, enforced unsystematically and laxly. That is, -
i.e. while in some cases a negotiated approach is adopted, in yet another scenario 
convicted firms get away with simple warning. Indeed, inspection rates are very high 
but the penalties are very small, such that there are very few incentives for 
compliance. 
A related question, for example, is that of how many warning letters should lead to 
an automatic statutory notice or court action. For a number of firms, which have 
received such letters, it is still unknown as to whether a court action will ever come. 
Since the enforcement effort is so extensive, it does appear to affect the firms' 
behavior positively, while the morale of the authorities is impaired. Firms know that 
prosecution and meting out the penalties on them will be very difficult. On the other 
hand, regulators know that moving beyond the administration of warning letters to 
violating firms will pose a daunting task on them in courts. 
Policy Recommendations 
(a) Targeting of Enforcement Effort 
One of our findings is that, much more attention, by the enforcement officers, was 
devoted to ensuring that the firms got pollution equipment in place, rather than 
ensuring that it is operated correctly. In most countries, where regulatory 
enforcement has been effective, controls relating to wastewater pollution are 
predominantly confined to regulation at the point of production, not discharge. The 
standards, or regulations, at the point of discharge do not generate financial 
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incentives to improve the overall production technology by firms (i.e. adoption of 
water-saving technology) since they encourage window dressing activities, aimed 
at appeasing the enforcement officers. 
(b) Graduated Penalties 
The use of monitoring, warning letters, and court prosecutions, in the enforcement 
of industrial wastewater standards, is common to many countries, both developing 
and developed. However, these judicial steps should be embodied in graduated 
penalties. Currently, there are no differences in the punitive effects of these 
actions. For instance, a court action does not carry any bigger threat than that of 
monitoring. 
c) institutional Arrangements 
Current theoretical models of regulatory enforcement suggest that, a broad-based 
enforcement agency is likely to be able to achieve higher rates of compliance, than a 
group of smaller ones. An agency that covers a wide geography and/ or a variety of 
media is more likely to be able to identify and exploit synergies e.g. by implementing 
compliance-enhancing deals than one with a narrower range of jurisdiction (Heyes & 
Rickman, 1999:373). Some of the existing problems in regulatory enforcement could 
be eliminated via a centralised and broad-based enforcement authority for 
wastewater management in Kenya. 
Although some effort has already gone into the establishement of the National 
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the role of Local Authorities has not 
been redefined to exelude regulatory enforcement of wastewater standards. 
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Furthermore, many other government organizations, with duplicating roles, still 
remain in operation while modalities for exploiting synergies (between government 
departments) have not been established. 
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Notes 
[1] Lake Nakuru National Park contains a wetland of international importance, including the lake itself, 
which was designated a Ramsar site in 1990. Lake Nakuru is an important feeding ground for one or 
two million lesser flamingo (Phoenicoterus minor) and more than 450 other bird species. The park also 
supports large mammal populations, including the threatened Black Rhinocerous (Diceros bicornis), 
and over 400 species of flowering plants. Each year, Lake Nakuru National Park receives over 
200,000 visitors, making it the second most visited park in Kenya. 
[2] "Please refer to a letter Ref. no. MWD/.../DCON/186/4 of 7th April, 19.. which was addressed to 
you by the District Water Engineer, ... District and copied to this office, among others on the above 
subject and note that the design plans referred to by the District Water Engineer must be submitted 
urgently and that no activity, likely to generate polluting effluent, should be started without the 
necessary antí-pollution measures having been taken to the satisfaction of this Ministry. In this 
connection, you should further note that lack of co-operatiori and compliance on your part may lead to 
the Ministry taking legal action against you. Please take the necessary action accordingly." 
[3] "On 2nd July 1998, your industry was visited by our Pollution Control Officers for the inspection of 
your effluent treatment system and the manner of storage of raw material that your industry recycles to 
produce drums and containers. During the inspection, it was ascertained that the effluent treatment 
system has been converted into a septic tank for human waste disposal in addition to serving the raw 
material before processing. This office recommended the system solely for taking away the said 
wastewater. At no time did we ever recommend the utilisation of the system for treatment of human 
waste or any other related purpose Besides the improper utilisation of the effluent treatment 
system, it was also ascertained that contrary to our advice, that you use proper containers preferably 
high tensile polythene bags for storage of your raw material, you continué to store the material 
haphazardly all over the place, outside the factory, making the place look like a refuse dump. The raw 
material, as we know it, is actually very dirty as the containers mostly come from refuse dumps where 
all manner of filth is likely to be present. During the rains the filth is washed off the containers down 
into Ruiru river which is only about 20 metres away from the factory." 
[4] These effluent By-laws became effective from 25 lh March 1995, when they were first signed by 
the Minister for Local Government. 
[5] Especially because there is a serious mismatch between these charges and the máximum 
penalties payable under the law. 
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